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Intervention Mechanism Design
for Networks With Selfish Users
Jaeok Park and Mihaela van der Schaar
Abstract
We consider a multi-user network where a network manager and selfish users interact. The network
manager monitors the behavior of users and intervenes in the interaction among users if necessary, while
users make decisions independently to optimize their individual objectives. In this paper, we develop a
framework of intervention mechanism design, which is aimed to optimize the objective of the manager,
or the network performance, taking the incentives of selfish users into account. Our framework is general
enough to cover a wide range of application scenarios, and it has advantages over existing approaches such
as Stackelberg strategies and pricing. To design an intervention mechanism and to predict the resulting
operating point, we formulate a new class of games called intervention games and a new solution concept
called intervention equilibrium. We provide analytic results about intervention equilibrium and optimal
intervention mechanisms in the case of a benevolent manager with perfect monitoring. We illustrate
these results with a random access model. Our illustrative example suggests that intervention requires
less knowledge about users than pricing.
Index Terms
Game theory, incentives, intervention, mechanism design, multi-user networks, network management
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Motivation and Our Approach
In noncooperative multi-user networks, multiple users interact with each other making decisions inde-
pendently to optimize their individual objectives. Operation by selfish users often results in a suboptimal
network performance, and this calls for an incentive mechanism to guide selfish users to behave according
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2to the system objective. In this paper, we propose a class of incentive mechanisms, called intervention
mechanisms, that can be used when there is a network manager that can monitor the behavior of users
and intervene in the interaction among users if necessary. Since the manager can react to the behavior
of users through an intervention mechanism, an intervention mechanism has the potential to shape the
incentives of users.
To design an intervention mechanism and to predict the resulting operating point, we formulate a new
class of games called intervention games and a new solution concept called intervention equilibrium. In
an intervention game, the manager first chooses an intervention mechanism, and then users choose their
actions knowing the intervention mechanism chosen by the manager. After observing a signal about the
actions of users, the manager chooses its action according to the intervention mechanism. An intervention
mechanism specifies an action that the manager takes following each possible signal realization, and thus
can be considered as a protocol that prescribes a rule according to which the manager rewards and
punishes users depending on their observed behavior. The manager chooses an intervention mechanism
to optimize its objective, anticipating the rational behavior of users given the intervention mechanism it
chooses. Intervention equilibrium predicts the outcome of an intervention game in terms of an intervention
mechanism designed by the manager and an operating point chosen by users.
B. Related Work
An approach similar to ours can be found in [1]. The authors of [1] consider a congestion control
problem and analyze performance under different scheduling mechanisms, which can be considered as
intervention mechanisms. With a scheduling mechanism that assigns a higher priority to flows with a
smaller rate, the input rates of users can be restrained voluntarily. In other words, users do not send
their traffic excessively in their self-interest because doing so will result in a higher probability that
their packets are dropped. Another closely related work is our previous work [2]. In [2], we consider a
random access network where the manager can intervene by jamming the packets of users and show that
intervention mechanisms can successfully control the transmission probabilities of selfish users. However,
these works consider only specific communication networks. In this paper, we aim to develop a general
framework of intervention mechanisms that can be applied to various application scenarios including not
only communication networks but also other scenarios such as file sharing on peer-to-peer networks,
multi-task processing on cloud computers, and load balancing on multi-core processors.
In an intervention game, the manager makes a decision before users do, and thus the manager can be
considered as a leader and users as followers. Such a hierarchical structure of multi-user interaction has
3been modeled as a Stackelberg game in the context of congestion control [3], medium access control
[4], and power control [5]. The main difference between our intervention approach and the traditional
Stackelberg approach can be found in the ability of the manager. In an intervention game, the manager
can monitor the actions of users and can commit to an intervention mechanism. Hence, a strategy of
the manager is its complete contingent plan for actions to be taken given a signal realization. On the
other hand, in the Stackelberg games in [3]–[5], the leader does not have monitoring and commitment
capabilities, and thus simply chooses an action before followers choose their actions. Our formulation
includes the traditional Stackelberg formulation as a special case, because an intervention mechanism
reduces to an action if the manager chooses the same action regardless of signal realizations or if it
observes no signal. Therefore, intervention games yield higher design flexibility for the manager than
traditional Stackelberg games do, enabling the greater potential to shape the incentives of users.
Pricing mechanisms that charge users for their usage have received a significant amount of attention
in the literature [6]. Pricing mechanisms have a solid theoretical foundation in economics as well as
high design flexibility. They can be considered as a special class of intervention mechanisms, where the
intervention of the manager corresponds to charging and collecting payments from users. The existing
literature has studied pricing mechanisms using Stackelberg games in the context of congestion control
[7] and cognitive radio networks [8].
C. Focus and Advantages of Our Approach
Our discussion so far suggests a classification of intervention into direct and indirect intervention.
Intervention is direct (resp. indirect) if the manager interacts with users in the inside (resp. outside) of
the network. In other words, the manager with direct intervention intervenes in the network usage of
users, while the manager with indirect intervention influences the utilities of users through an outside
instrument, for example, monetary payments in the case of pricing. Direct intervention can be further
classified into adaptive and constant intervention, depending on whether the manager can react to the
actions of users. Traditional Stackelberg strategies where the manager takes an action before users do
belong to constant intervention. Table I classifies the existing intervention approaches in the literature
according to the above criteria.
Although our framework covers all the three classes of intervention in Table I, our main focus is
on adaptive direct intervention, which has not received much attention from researchers compared to
the other two classes. Adaptive direct intervention is useful compared to constant direct intervention
especially when the manager does not value its usage of the network. In this scenario, the manager
4TABLE I
CLASSIFICATION OF THE EXISTING INTERVENTION APPROACHES IN THE LITERATURE.
Direct intervention Indirect intervention
Adaptive Constant (e.g., pricing)
[1], [2] [3], [4], [5] [7], [8]
desires to achieve a certain operating point with the minimum level of intervention. With constant direct
intervention the manager needs to consume network resources in order to impact the behavior of users,
whereas with adaptive direct intervention the manager can use intervention only as a threat to punish
users in case of deviation. Direct intervention has an advantage over indirect intervention in terms of
implementation. Since direct intervention affects the network usage of users directly, users cannot evade
intervention as long as they use the network. On the contrary, enforcing the outside instrument of indirect
intervention can be costly especially when the network is freely accessible. The difference between direct
and indirect intervention yields an informational advantage of direct intervention over indirect intervention.
For instance, direct intervention in [1] and [2] affects the data rates of users. Hence, the effectiveness of
a direct intervention mechanism is independent of the way users value their data rate. On the contrary,
designing a pricing mechanism to achieve a certain operating point in general requires the manager to
know the utility functions of users. This point is illustrated with an example in Section V.
D. Comparison with Other Frameworks
We first compare the framework of intervention mechanism design with that of network utility max-
imization (NUM) [9]. Since our framework allows a general form of the objective of the manager,
the objective can be set as the sum of the utilities of users, as in NUM. The main difference between
intervention and NUM is that intervention takes into account the incentives of selfish users whereas NUM
assumes obedient users. The NUM framework aims to design a distributed algorithm following which
obedient users can reach a system-wide optimal operating point, using prices as congestion signals. On
the contrary, the intervention framework aims to design an incentive mechanism that induces selfish users
to achieve an incentive-constrained optimal operating point. Hence, the intervention framework is more
relevant in a network with selfish users.
Next, we compare intervention games and repeated games [10], which share a common goal of
sustaining cooperation among selfish individuals. With a repeated game strategy such as tit-for-tat, users
monitor the actions of other users and choose their actions depending on their past observations. Hence,
5the burden of monitoring and executing reward and punishment is distributed to users in a repeated game,
while it is imposed solely on the manager in an intervention game. If there is no reliable manager in
the network, a mechanism based on a repeated game strategy is a possible alternative to an intervention
mechanism. However, in order to implement a repeated game strategy, users in the network must interact
frequently and maintain histories of their observations. Moreover, sustaining an optimal operating point
with a repeated game strategy often requires users to be sufficiently patient. On the contrary, implementing
intervention mechanisms effectively requires neither repeated interaction nor patience of users.
Lastly, we compare intervention mechanism design with standard mechanism design [11], [12]. A
standard mechanism design problem considers a scenario where the manager can control the system
configuration but has incomplete information about the types of users. Thus, standard mechanism design
is concerned about incentives regarding types, whereas intervention mechanism design in this paper
cares about incentives regarding actions. In economics terminology, standard mechanism design focuses
on adverse selection while our intervention mechanism design focuses on moral hazard [11]. We can
modify or extend our framework to study the capabilities and limitations of intervention mechanisms
to overcome incentive problems in the presence of only adverse selection or both adverse selection and
moral hazard. We leave these topics for future research.
E. Organization of the Paper
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we formulate the framework of
intervention mechanism design, defining intervention games and intervention equilibrium. In Section III,
we classify the types of intervention and the manager to point out the broad scope of our framework. In
Section IV, we consider a benevolent manager with perfect monitoring and provide analytic results about
intervention equilibrium. In Section V, we apply our framework to random access networks in order to
illustrate the results. We conclude in Section VI.
II. FRAMEWORK
We consider a multi-user network where users interact with each other taking actions independently.
There is a network manager that can intervene in the interaction of users. There are N users in the
network, and the set of users is denoted by N = {1, . . . , N}. For convenience, we call the manager
user 0. To distinguish the users from the manager, we sometimes refer to a user as a regular user. The
regular users are indexed from user 1 to user N . The set of all the users including the manager is denoted
by N0 = N ∪ {0}. Each user i ∈ N0 chooses an action ai from the set of actions available to it, which
6is denoted by Ai. An action profile of the regular users is written as a = (a1, . . . , aN ), while the set of
action profiles of the regular users is written as A =
∏
i∈N Ai. An action profile of the regular users
other than regular user i is written as a−i = (a1, . . . , ai−1, ai+1, . . . , aN ) so that a can be expressed as
a = (ai, a−i).
The actions of the manager and the users jointly determine utilities they receive. The utility function
of user i ∈ N0 is denoted by ui : A0 × A → R. That is, ui(a0, a) represents the utility that user i
receives when the manager chooses action a0 and the users choose an action profile a. The manager is
different from the regular users in that the manager is able to monitor the actions of the regular users
before it takes its action. The monitoring ability of the manager is formally represented by a monitoring
technology (S, ρ). S is the set of all possible signals that the manager can obtain, while ρ is a mapping
from A to △(S), where △(S) is the set of probability distributions over S. That is, ρ(a) represents the
probability distribution of signals when the regular users choose a.
Since the manager takes its action after observing a signal, a strategy for the manager is its complete
contingent plan for actions to be taken following all possible signal realizations while a strategy for a
regular user is simply its choice of an action.1 Thus, a strategy for the manager can be represented by
a function f : S → A0, which we call an intervention mechanism. That is, an intervention mechanism
specifies an action taken by the manager following each signal it can observe. Let F be the set of all
intervention mechanisms, i.e., the set of all functions from S to A0. We assume that the manager is able
to commit to an intervention mechanism and that the intervention mechanism chosen by the manager is
known to the regular users when they choose their actions.2
To sum up, an intervention game is summarized by the data
G = 〈N0, (Ai)i∈N0 , (ui)i∈N0 , (S, ρ)〉 ,
and the timing of an intervention game can be described as follows.
1) The manager chooses an intervention mechanism f ∈ F .
2) The regular users choose their actions a ∈ A independently and simultaneously, knowing the
intervention mechanism f chosen by the manager.
3) The manager observes a signal s ∈ S, which is realized following a probability distribution ρ(a) ∈
△(S).
1For expositional simplicity, we restrict attention to pure strategies, although our formulation extends easily to the case of
randomized strategies.
2The information about the intervention mechanism can be obtained by an agreed protocol specification or by learning.
74) The manager chooses its action a0 ∈ A0 according to f , i.e., a0 = f(s).
5) The users receive their utilities based on the chosen actions (a0, a) ∈ A0 ×A.
Consider an intervention mechanism f ∈ F , and define a function vfi : A→ R by
vfi (a) = Eρ(a)[ui(f(s), a)], (1)
for all i ∈ N , where Eρ(a)[·] denotes expectation with respect to the random variable s following the
distribution ρ(a). Then vfi (a) represents the expected utility that regular user i receives when the manager
uses intervention mechanism f and the regular users choose action profile a. An intervention mechanism
f induces a simultaneous game played by the regular users, whose normal form representation is given
by
Gf =
〈
N , (Ai)i∈N , (v
f
i )i∈N
〉
.
We can predict actions chosen by the selfish regular users given an intervention mechanism f by applying
the solution concept of Nash equilibrium to the induced game Gf .
Definition 1: An intervention mechanism f ∈ F supports the action profile a∗ ∈ A of the regular
users if a∗ is a Nash equilibrium of the game Gf , i.e.,
vfi (a
∗
i , a
∗
−i) ≥ v
f
i (ai, a
∗
−i) for all ai ∈ Ai, for all i ∈ N .
Also, f strongly supports a∗ if a∗ is a unique Nash equilibrium of Gf .
If an action profile a∗ is supported by an intervention mechanism f , the regular users cannot gain by
a unilateral deviation from a∗ as long as the manager uses intervention mechanism f . When choosing an
intervention mechanism, the manager can expect that the regular users will choose an action profile that
is supported by the intervention mechanism it chooses. However, when there are multiple action profiles
supported by the intervention mechanism, the manager may be uncertain about the action profile chosen
by the regular users. This uncertainty disappears when the intervention mechanism strongly supports an
action profile. In the formulation of our solution concept, we assume that the regular users will always
select the best Nash equilibrium for the manager if the induced game has multiple Nash equilibria.
Definition 2: (f∗, a∗) ∈ F × A is an (strong) equilibrium of intervention game G, or an (strong)
intervention equilibrium, if f∗ (strongly) supports a∗ and
Eρ(a∗)[u0(f
∗(s), a∗)] ≥ Eρ(a)[u0(f(s), a)] for all (f, a) ∈ F ×A such that f supports a.
f∗ ∈ F is an (strongly) optimal intervention mechanism if there exists an action profile a∗ ∈ A such that
(f∗, a∗) is an (strong) intervention equilibrium.
8Intervention equilibrium is a solution concept for intervention games, based on a backward induc-
tion argument, assuming that the manager can commit to an intervention mechanism and predict the
rational reaction of the regular users to its choice of an intervention mechanism. An intervention equi-
librium can be considered as a Stackelberg equilibrium (or a subgame perfect equilibrium) applied
to an intervention game G, since the induced game Gf is a subgame of G. Since we assume that
the manager can induce the regular users to choose the best Nash equilibrium for it in the case of
multiple Nash equilibria, the problem of designing an optimal intervention mechanism can be expressed
as maxf∈F maxa∈E(f) Eρ(a)[u0(f(s), a)], where E(f) denotes the set of action profiles supported by f .
III. CLASSIFICATION OF INTERVENTION AND THE MANAGER
In this section, we classify the types of intervention depending on the form of the utility functions
of the regular users (i.e., the way the manager interacts with the regular users) and the types of the
manager depending on the form of the utility function the manager (i.e., the objective of the manager).
The purpose of classification is to suggest that a wide range of application scenarios can be modeled in
the framework of intervention.
Definition 3: Let Ai ⊂ RK for some K, for all i ∈ N0. Intervention is additively symmetric if, for
each i ∈ N , there exist functions gkij : R → R and hki : R2 → R, for k = 1, . . . ,K and for j ∈ N0 \ {i},
such that
ui(a0, a) =
K∑
k=1
hki

aki , ∑
j∈N0\{i}
gkij(a
k
j )

 ,
where aki denotes the k-th element of ai. Intervention is multiplicatively symmetric if, for each i ∈ N ,
there exist functions gkij : R→ R and hki : R2 → R, for k = 1, . . . ,K and for j ∈ N0 \ {i}, such that
ui(a0, a) =
K∑
k=1
hki

aki , ∏
j∈N0\{i}
gkij(a
k
j )

 .
Intervention is symmetric if it is either additively or multiplicatively symmetric.
The manager with symmetric intervention uses the network as the regular users do, in the same
position as the regular users. The effect of the actions of other uses including the manager on a regular
user is represented by an additive term in the case of additive symmetric intervention and a multiplicative
term in the case of multiplicatively symmetric intervention. Network models in which the manager can
exert additive symmetric intervention include routing [3] and frequency-selective Gaussian interference
channels [5]. Multiplicative symmetric intervention can be used in the random access model of [2].
9We can interpret the objective of the manager as the system objective, which can vary depending on
the types of the manager. Below we classify the manager with symmetric intervention depending on the
form of its utility function.
Definition 4: Consider symmetric intervention. The manager is benevolent if
u0(a0, a) =
∑
i∈N
wiui(a0, a)
for some (w1, . . . , wN ) ∈ RN+ . The manager is self-interested if there exist functions gk0j : R → R and
hk0 : R
2 → R, for k = 1, . . . ,K and for j ∈ N , such that
u0(a0, a) =
K∑
k=1
hk0

aki ,∑
j∈N
gk0j(a
k
j )

 (2)
in the case of additively symmetric intervention, and
u0(a0, a) =
K∑
k=1
hk0

aki ,∏
j∈N
gk0j(a
k
j )

 (3)
in the case of multiplicatively symmetric intervention. The manager is total welfare maximizing if
u0(a0, a) = w0u˜0(a0, a) +
∑
i∈N
wiui(a0, a)
for some (w0, w1, . . . , wN ) ∈ RN+1+ , where u˜0(a0, a) denotes the right-hand side of (2) if intervention
is additively symmetric and that of (3) if intervention is multiplicatively symmetric.
A benevolent manager maximizes the welfare of the regular users, attaching a welfare weight wi to
regular user i. The utility function of a self-interested manager has the same structure as those of the
regular users. Recall that the manager with symmetric intervention uses the network as the regular users
do. A benevolent manager does not derive any utility from its usage of the network, whereas the utility
of a self-interested manager is derived solely from its usage [5]. A total welfare maximizing manager
derives utility from its usage as well as that of the other users [3].
It is also possible that the manager plays a special role in the network, participating in interaction in a
different way from the regular users. For example, the manager plays the role of a scheduler in [1] and a
billing authority in pricing [7], [8]. We call this type of intervention asymmetric intervention to contrast it
with symmetric intervention.3 We present two representative examples of asymmetric intervention, which
arise naturally in games with transferable utility [13].
3Indirect intervention is necessarily asymmetric, while direct intervention can be symmetric or asymmetric.
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Definition 5: Intervention is asymmetric if it is not symmetric. Let A0 = RN+ . Intervention is additively
asymmetric if, for each i ∈ N , there exists function gi : A→ R such that
ui(a0, a) = gi(a)− a
i
0,
where ai0 is the i-th element of a0. Let A0 = [0, 1]N . Intervention is multiplicatively asymmetric if, for
each i ∈ N , there exists function gi : A→ R+ such that
ui(a0, a) = (1− a
i
0)gi(a).
With additively asymmetric intervention, the manager takes away the amount ai0 from the benefit gi(a)
that regular user i receives from its usage of the network. With multiplicatively asymmetric intervention,
the manager deducts the ai0 fraction of the benefit that regular user i receives. Hence, the two types
of asymmetric intervention in Definition 5 can be compared to two different forms of taxation, where
additively asymmetric intervention corresponds to taxation with lump-sum tax rates and multiplicatively
asymmetric intervention to taxation with proportional tax rates.
Definition 6: Consider additively or multiplicatively asymmetric intervention. Let c0 : A → R+ be a
function that represents the operating cost of the network. The manager is benevolent if
u0(a0, a) =
∑
i∈N
ui(a0, a).
The manager is self-interested if
u0(a0, a) =
∑
i∈N
ai0 − c0(a)
in the case of additively asymmetric intervention, and
u0(a0, a) =
∑
i∈N
ai0gi(a)− c0(a)
in the case of multiplicatively asymmetric intervention. The manager is total welfare maximizing if
u0(a0, a) =
∑
i∈N
gi(a)− c0(a).
In Definition 6, we use welfare weights wi = 1 for all i ∈ N0 because of the assumption of transferable
utility. For ease of interpretation, let us regard the transfer from the regular users to the manager as
payments. A benevolent manager does not value payments (or burns payments) it receives from the regular
users, and thus payments create a welfare loss. On the contrary, a self-interested manager values payments
from the regular users, and it maximizes its profit measured by the total payment minus the operating
cost. If there is no operating cost, i.e., c0 ≡ 0, then the objective of a self-interested manager is revenue
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maximization. A total welfare maximizing manager maximizes the net gain from operating the network,
which is the total benefit of the regular users minus the operating cost. We can also consider an individually
rational benevolent manager that has utility function u0(a0, a) =
∑
i∈N ui(a0, a) and faces the individual
rationality constraint that requires the total payment it receives to be no less than the operating cost (i.e.,∑
i∈N a
i
0 ≥ c0(a) in the case of additively asymmetric intervention and
∑
i∈N a
i
0gi(a) ≥ c0(a) in the
case of multiplicatively asymmetric intervention). In case that a regular user has an outside option, the
individual rationality constraint for the regular user can be taken care of by including in its action space
an action that corresponds to choosing its outside option.
IV. BENEVOLENT MANAGER WITH PERFECT MONITORING
In this section, we analyze a class of intervention games that satisfy the following maintained assump-
tions, while leaving the analysis of other classes for future work.
Assumption 1: (i) (Benevolent manager) The utility function of the manager is given by u0(a0, a) =∑
i∈N ui(a0, a) for all (a0, a) ∈ A0 ×A.
(ii) (Existence of minimal and maximal intervention actions) There exist the minimal and maximal
elements of A0, denoted a0 and a0, respectively, in the sense that for all i ∈ N , a0 and a0 satisfy
ui(a0, a) ≥ ui(a0, a) ≥ ui(a0, a) for all a0 ∈ A0, for all a ∈ A.
(iii) (Perfect monitoring) The monitoring technology of the manager is perfect in the sense that the
manager can observe the actions of the regular users without errors. Formally, a monitoring technology
(S, ρ) is perfect if S = A and only signal a can arise in the distribution ρ(a) for all a ∈ A.
In Assumption 1(i), we set welfare weights as wi = 1 for all i ∈ N in order to cover both cases of
transferable and nontransferable utility, although our results extend easily to general welfare weights. In
Assumption 1(ii), a0 and a0 can be interpreted as the minimal and maximal intervention actions of the
manager, respectively. For given a ∈ A, each regular user receives the highest (resp. lowest) utility when
the manager takes the minimal (resp. maximal) intervention action. In other words, the utilities of the
regular users are aligned with respect to the action of the manager so that the manager can reward or
punish all the regular users at the same time. Combining Assumption 1(i) and (ii), we obtain
u0(a0, a) ≥ u0(a0, a) ≥ u0(a0, a) for all a0 ∈ A0, for all a ∈ A. (4)
Thus, for given a ∈ A the benevolent manager prefers to use the minimal intervention action. With
perfect monitoring, vfi defined in (1) reduces to vfi (a) = ui(f(a), a) for all a ∈ A.
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We first characterize the set of action profiles of the regular users that can be supported by an
intervention mechanism. Define E = ∪f∈FE(f) = {a ∈ A : ∃f ∈ F such that f supports a}.
Proposition 1: a∗ ∈ E if and only if ui(a0, a∗) ≥ ui(a0, ai, a∗−i) for all ai ∈ Ai, for all i ∈ N .
Proof: Suppose that ui(a0, a∗) ≥ ui(a0, ai, a∗−i) for all ai ∈ Ai, for all i ∈ N . Define an intervention
mechanism fa˜, for each a˜ ∈ A, by
fa˜(a) =


a0 if a = a˜,
a0 otherwise.
(5)
Then fa∗ supports a∗, and thus a∗ ∈ E .
Suppose that a∗ ∈ E . Then there exists an intervention mechanism f such that ui(f(a∗), a∗) ≥
ui(f(ai, a
∗
−i), ai, a
∗
−i) for all ai ∈ Ai, for all i ∈ N . Then we obtain ui(a0, a∗) ≥ ui(f(a∗), a∗) ≥
ui(f(ai, a
∗
−i), ai, a
∗
−i) ≥ ui(a0, ai, a
∗
−i) for all ai ∈ Ai, for all i ∈ N , where the first and the third
inequalities follow from Assumption 1(ii).
The basic idea underlying Proposition 1 is that for given a∗ ∈ A, fa∗ is the most effective intervention
mechanism to support a∗. Thus, in order to find out whether a∗ is supported by some intervention
function, it suffices to check whether a∗ is supported by fa∗ . We call fa˜, defined in (5), the maximum
punishment intervention mechanism with target action profile a˜, because the manager using fa˜ takes
the maximum intervention action whenever the users do not follow the action profile a˜. Let Fp be the
set of all maximum punishment intervention mechanisms, i.e., Fp = {fa˜ ∈ F : a˜ ∈ A}. Also, define
Ep = ∪f∈FpE(f) = {a ∈ A : ∃f ∈ F
p such that f supports a}. The second part of the proof of
Proposition 1 shows that if a∗ is supported by some intervention mechanism f , then it is also supported
by the maximum punishment intervention mechanism with target action profile a∗, fa∗ . This observation
leads us to the following corollary.
Corollary 1: (i) E = Ep.
(ii) If (f∗, a∗) is an intervention equilibrium, then (fa∗ , a∗) is also an intervention equilibrium.
Proof: (i) E ⊃ Ep follows from F ⊃ Fp, while E ⊂ Ep follows from Proposition 1.
(ii) Suppose that (f∗, a∗) is an intervention equilibrium. Then by Definition 2, f∗ supports a∗, and
u0(f
∗(a∗), a∗) ≥ u0(f(a), a) for all (f, a) ∈ F ×A such that f supports a. Since a∗ ∈ E , fa∗ supports
a∗ by Proposition 1. Hence, u0(f∗(a∗), a∗) ≥ u0(fa∗(a∗), a∗). On the other hand, since fa∗(a∗) = a0,
we have u0(f∗(a∗), a∗) ≤ u0(fa∗(a∗), a∗) by (4). Therefore, u0(f∗(a∗), a∗) = u0(fa∗(a∗), a∗), and thus
u0(fa∗(a
∗), a∗) ≥ u0(f(a), a) for all (f, a) ∈ F × A such that f supports a. This proves that (fa∗ , a∗)
is an intervention equilibrium.
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Corollary 1 shows that there is no loss of generality in two senses when we restrict attention to
maximum punishment intervention mechanisms. First, the set of action profiles that can be supported by
an intervention mechanism remains the same when we consider only maximum punishment intervention
mechanisms. Second, if there exists an optimal intervention mechanism, we can find an optimal inter-
vention mechanism among maximum punishment intervention mechanisms. The following proposition
provides a necessary and sufficient condition under which a maximum punishment intervention mechanism
together with its target action profile constitutes an intervention equilibrium.
Proposition 2: (fa∗ , a∗) is an intervention equilibrium if and only if a∗ ∈ E and u0(a0, a∗) ≥ u0(a0, a)
for all a ∈ E .
Proof: Suppose that (fa∗ , a∗) is an intervention equilibrium. Then fa∗ supports a∗, and thus a∗ ∈ E .
Also, u0(fa∗(a∗), a∗) ≥ u0(f(a), a) for all (f, a) ∈ F × A such that f supports a. Choose any a ∈ E .
Then by Proposition 1, fa supports a, and thus u0(a0, a∗) = u0(fa∗(a∗), a∗) ≥ u0(fa(a), a) = u0(a0, a).
Suppose that a∗ ∈ E and u0(a0, a∗) ≥ u0(a0, a) for all a ∈ E . To prove that (fa∗ , a∗) is an intervention
equilibrium, we need to show (i) fa∗ supports a∗, and (ii) u0(fa∗(a∗), a∗) ≥ u0(f(a), a) for all (f, a) ∈
F × A such that f supports a. Since a∗ ∈ E , (i) follows from Proposition 1. To prove (ii), choose any
(f, a) ∈ F × A such that f supports a. Then u0(fa∗(a∗), a∗) = u0(a0, a∗) ≥ u0(a0, a) ≥ u0(f(a), a),
where the first inequality follows from a ∈ E .
Proposition 2 implies that if we obtain an action profile a∗ such that a∗ ∈ argmaxa∈E u0(a0, a),
we can use it to construct an intervention equilibrium and thus an optimal intervention mechanism.
Corollary 1(ii) implies that, when we want to find out whether a given action profile can be supported
by an optimal intervention mechanism, we can consider only the maximum punishment intervention
mechanism having the action profile as its target action profile. However, when we are given an optimal
intervention mechanism fa∗ in the class of maximum punishment intervention mechanisms, it is not certain
whether its target action profile a∗ or some other action profile constitutes an intervention equilibrium
together with fa∗ . The following proposition provides a sufficient condition under which a given optimal
intervention mechanism fa∗ must be paired with its target action profile a∗ to form an intervention
equilibrium.
Proposition 3: Suppose that u0(a0, a) > u0(a0, a) for all a ∈ E . If fa∗ ∈ Fp is an optimal intervention
mechanism, then (fa∗ , a∗) is an intervention equilibrium and there exists no other a 6= a∗ such that (fa∗ , a)
is an intervention equilibrium.
Proof: Suppose that fa∗ ∈ Fp is an optimal intervention mechanism. Then there must exist a′ ∈ A
such that (fa∗ , a′) is an intervention equilibrium, i.e., (i) fa∗ supports a′, and (ii) u0(fa∗(a′), a′) ≥
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u0(f(a), a) for all (f, a) ∈ F ×A such that f supports a. Suppose that there exists a′ 6= a∗ that satisfies
(i) and (ii). Since fa∗ supports a′, we have a′ ∈ E and thus fa′ supports a′. Then, by (ii), u0(a0, a′) =
u0(fa∗(a
′), a′) ≥ u0(fa′(a
′), a′) = u0(a0, a
′), which contradicts the assumption that u0(a0, a) > u0(a0, a)
for all a ∈ E . Therefore, there cannot exist a′ 6= a∗ that satisfies (i) and (ii). Since there must exist a′ ∈ A
that satisfies (i) and (ii), a∗ must satisfy (i) and (ii).
Although maximum punishment intervention mechanisms have a simple structure and are most ef-
fective in supporting a given action profile, they also have weaknesses. First, even when (fa∗ , a∗) is an
intervention equilibrium, there may be other action profiles that are also supported by fa∗ . For example, in
the case of multiplicatively asymmetric intervention where we have a0 = (0, . . . , 0) and a0 = (1, . . . , 1),
fa∗ supports any action profile a′ that has at least two different elements from those of a∗. At such
an action profile, the regular users receive zero utility. As long as u0(a0, a∗) > 0, a∗ Pareto dominates
other action profiles that are supported by fa∗ , and this can provide a rationale that the regular users
will select a∗ among multiple Nash equilibria of the game induced by fa∗ . However, in principle, the
regular users may select any Nash equilibrium, and the manager cannot guarantee that the regular users
will choose the intended target action profile a∗ when there are other Nash equilibria. Strongly optimal
intervention mechanisms have robustness in that they yield a unique Nash equilibrium and thus the
issue of multiple Nash equilibria does not arise. As mentioned in Section II, an implicit assumption
underlying the concept of intervention equilibrium is that the regular users will always select the best
Nash equilibrium for the manager in the induced game. If the manager takes a conservative approach,
it may assume that the regular users will choose the worst Nash equilibrium for it. In this case, an
optimal intervention mechanism solves maxf∈F mina∈E(f) Eρ(a)[u0(f(s), a)], which has a similar spirit
as maximin strategies [13] in non-zero-sum games.
Another weakness of maximum punishment intervention mechanisms is that they may incur a large
efficiency loss when there are errors in the system. For example, when a regular user chooses an action
different from the one it intends to take by mistake (i.e., trembling hand) or when the manager receives
an incorrect signal (i.e., noisy observation), the maximal intervention action is applied even if the regular
users (intend to) choose the target action profile. The case of noisy observation can be covered by modeling
the monitoring technology of the manager as imperfect monitoring. In order to overcome this weakness
in the case of perfect monitoring, we can consider a class of continuous intervention mechanisms (i.e.,
intervention mechanisms represented by a continuous function from A to A0) if the action spaces are
15
continua.4 To obtain a concrete result, we consider an intervention game where Ai = [ai, ai] ⊂ R with
ai < ai for all i ∈ N0 and ui(a0, a) is strictly decreasing in a0 on [a0, a0] for all a ∈ A, for all i ∈ N .
We define an intervention mechanism fa˜,c, for each a˜ ∈ A and c ∈ RN , by
fa˜,c(a) = [c · (a− a˜)]
a0
a
0
,
for all a ∈ A, where [x]βα = min{max{x, α}, β}. We call fa˜,c the affine intervention mechanism with
target action profile a˜ and intervention rate profile c. The following proposition constructs an affine
intervention mechanism to support an interior target action profile in the case of differentiable utility
functions.
Proposition 4: Suppose that ui is twice continuously differentiable for all i ∈ N . Let a∗ ∈ A be an
action profile such that a∗i ∈ (ai, ai) for all i ∈ N , and let
c∗i = −
∂ui(a0, a
∗)/∂ai
∂ui(a0, a
∗)/∂a0
(6)
for all i ∈ N .5 Suppose that
∂2ui
∂a2i
(a0, ai, a
∗
−i) ≤ 0 for all ai ∈ (ai, ai) (7)
for all i ∈ N such that c∗i = 0,
∂2ui
∂a2i
(a0, ai, a
∗
−i) ≤ 0 for all ai ∈ (ai, a∗i ), (8)
(
(c∗i )
2 ∂
2ui
∂a20
+ 2c∗i
∂2ui
∂ai∂a0
+
∂2ui
∂a2i
) ∣∣∣∣
(a0,ai,a−i)=(c∗i (ai−a
∗
i )+a0,ai,a
∗
−i)
≤ 0
for all ai ∈ (a∗i ,min{ai, a∗i + (a0 − a0)/c∗i }), (9)
∂ui
∂ai
(a0, ai, a
∗
−i) ≤ 0 for all ai ∈ (a∗i + (a0 − a0)/c∗i , ai) (10)
for all i ∈ N such that c∗i > 0, and
∂ui
∂ai
(a0, ai, a
∗
−i) ≥ 0 for all ai ∈ (ai, a∗i + (a0 − a0)/c∗i ),
(
(c∗i )
2 ∂
2ui
∂a20
+ 2c∗i
∂2ui
∂ai∂a0
+
∂2ui
∂a2i
) ∣∣∣∣
(a0,ai,a−i)=(c∗i (ai−a
∗
i )+a0,ai,a
∗
−i)
≤ 0
for all ai ∈ (max{ai, a∗i + (a0 − a0)/c∗i }, a∗i ), (11)
4Following [10], we say that an action space is a continuum if it is a compact and convex subset of the Euclidean space RK
for some K.
5We define ∂ui(a0, a∗)/∂a0 as the right partial derivative of ui with respect to a0 at (a0, a∗).
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∂2ui
∂a2i
(a0, ai, a
∗
−i) ≤ 0 for all ai ∈ (a∗i , ai)
for all i ∈ N such that c∗i < 0.6 Then fa∗,c∗ supports a∗.
Proof: See the Appendix.
Note that ∂ui(a0, a∗)/∂a0 < 0 for all i ∈ N since ui is strictly decreasing in a0. Thus, c∗i , defined
in (6), has the same sign as ∂ui(a0, a∗)/∂ai. With A0 = [a0, a0], the action of the manager can be
interpreted as the intervention level, and the regular users receive higher utility as the intervention level
is smaller. The affine intervention mechanism fa∗,c∗ , constructed in Proposition 4, has the properties that
the manager chooses the minimal intervention level a0 when the regular users choose the target action
profile a∗, i.e., fa∗,c∗(a∗) = a0, and that the intervention level increases in the rate of |c∗i | as regular
user i deviates to the direction in which its utility increases at (a0, a∗). The expression of c∗i in (6)
has an intuitive explanation. Since c∗i is proportional to ∂ui(a0, a∗)/∂ai and inversely proportional to
−∂ui(a0, a
∗)/∂a0, a regular user faces a higher intervention rate as its incentive to deviate from (a0, a∗)
is stronger and as a change in the intervention level has a smaller impact on its utility. The intervention
level does not react to the action of regular user i when c∗i = 0, because regular user i chooses a∗i in its
self-interest even when the intervention level is fixed at a0, provided that other regular users choose a∗−i.
Finally, we note that if (fa∗ , a∗) is an intervention equilibrium and fa∗,c supports a∗ for some c, then
(fa∗,c, a
∗) is also an intervention equilibrium, since fa∗(a∗) = fa∗,c(a∗) = a0.
V. APPLICATION TO RANDOM ACCESS NETWORKS
In this section, we illustrate the results of Section IV by introducing a manager in a model of random
access networks, similar to the model of [14]. Time is divided into slots of equal length, and a user
can transmit its packet or wait in each slot. Due to interference, a packet is successfully transmitted
only if there is no other packet transmitted in the current slot. If more than one packet is transmitted
simultaneously, a collision occurs. The manager can transmit its packets as users do, and it interferes
with all the users.
We model the random access scenario as an intervention game. We assume that each user, including
the manager, transmits its packets with a fixed probability over time. The action of user i, ai, is thus its
transmission probability, and we have Ai = [0, 1] for all i ∈ N0. The average data rate for user i ∈ N
6We define (α, β) = ∅ if α ≥ β.
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when the users transmit according to the probabilities (a0, a) ∈ A0 ×A is given by
ri(a0, a) = γiai
∏
j∈N0\{i}
(1− aj),
where γi > 0 is the fixed peak data rate for user i. The benefit that a regular user i obtains from its average
data rate is represented by a utility function Ui : R+ → R, which is assumed to be strictly increasing.
Hence, the utility function of regular user i in the intervention game is given by ui(a0, a) = Ui(ri(a0, a)).
We assume that the manager is benevolent with the utility function u0(a0, a) =
∑
i∈N ui(a0, a) and that
its monitoring technology is perfect.
In the above intervention game, the minimal and maximal intervention actions are given by a0 = 0
and a0 = 1, respectively. Since ri(0, a) ≥ 0 and ri(1, a) = 0 for all a ∈ A, for all i ∈ N , we have
E = A by Proposition 1. In other words, any action profile a ∈ A can be supported by an intervention
mechanism. Because the maximal intervention action yields zero rate to all the users regardless of the
action profile, the maximum punishment is strong enough to prevent deviations from any target action
profile.7 Since A = [0, 1]N is compact and u0 is continuous, a solution to maxa∈A u0(0, a) exists. Then
by Proposition 2, (fa∗ , a∗) is an intervention equilibrium if and only if a∗ maximizes u0(0, a) on A.
Also, we can apply Proposition 4 to show that any a∗ ∈ (0, 1)N is supported by fa∗,c∗ with c∗i = 1/a∗i
for all i ∈ N . Suppose for the moment that the utility of each user is given by its average data rate,
i.e., ui(a0, a) = ri(a0, a) for all i ∈ N . Then for each i ∈ N , we obtain c∗i = 1/a∗i > 0 by (6), and we
can verify that the conditions (8)–(10) are satisfied. Thus, by Proposition 4, we can conclude that fa∗,c∗
supports a∗. Note that the concept of an intervention mechanism supporting an action profile is based on
Nash equilibrium, which uses only the ordinal properties of the utility functions. Therefore, fa∗,c∗ still
supports a∗ even when the utility function of user i is given by ui(a0, a) = Ui(ri(a0, a)) for any strictly
increasing function Ui, for all i ∈ N .
The above argument points out an informational advantage of direct intervention over indirect inter-
vention. To highlight the informational advantage of direct intervention, suppose that the objective of the
manager is to implement a target action profile a∗ ∈ (0, 1)N , determined independently of (U1, . . . , UN ),
while taking the minimal intervention action when the users choose a∗. Then the results in the previous
paragraph imply that the direct intervention mechanisms fa∗ and fa∗,c∗ with c∗i = 1/a∗i for all i ∈ N
support the action profile a∗ for any (U1, . . . , UN ). Since direct intervention affects utility through its
7In fact, a maximum punishment intervention mechanism can prevent not only unilateral deviations from its target action
profile but also joint deviations.
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impact on the rates, its effectiveness does not depend on the shapes of the utility functions. Thus, the
manager with direct intervention does not need to know the utility functions of the users, (U1, . . . , UN ),
in order to design an intervention mechanism that supports a target action profile.8 This property can be
considered as the robustness of direct intervention with respect to the utilities of the users.
To draw a contrast, consider an alternative intervention scenario where the manager intervenes through
pricing. In such a scenario, the action profile of the regular users determines their average data rates, i.e.,
ri(a) = γiai
∏
j∈N\{i}(1− aj) for all i ∈ N , while a pricing mechanism specifies the payments that the
regular users make depending on their action profile, i.e., f(a) = (f1(a), . . . , fN (a)), where fi(a) is the
payment of user i. Thus, the utility function of user i is given by
ui(f(a), a) = Ui(ri(a)) − fi(a).
As can be seen from the above expression, pricing affects utility by taking away utility units from the
users, and thus the shapes and scales of the utility functions matter to the manager when designing
optimal pricing mechanisms. For example, consider a pricing mechanism that charges each user an
amount proportional to its average data rate, i.e., fi(a) = piri(a) for all i ∈ N , where pi is the price of
unit data rate for user i. Then the pricing mechanism supports an action profile a∗ when the manager
sets pi = U ′i(ri(a
∗)) for all i ∈ N , assuming that Ui is differentiable and concave for all i ∈ N . This
example illustrates that, in contrast to direct intervention, the manager needs to know the utility functions
of the users, (U1, . . . , UN ), in order to design a pricing mechanism that supports a target action profile.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper presents the intervention framework that is aimed to optimize the objective of the manager,
or the network performance, taking the incentives of selfish users into account. We have highlighted
the generality and advantages of our framework. In particular, we have pointed out the advantages of
intervention over pricing in terms of implementation and informational requirement. To facilitate analysis
in the intervention framework, we have developed a new class of games called intervention games and
its solution concept called intervention equilibrium. Our analytic results in this paper are limited to
the special case of a benevolent manager with perfect monitoring. It is our plan for future research to
investigate intervention mechanisms in the case of imperfect monitoring, analyzing how errors in signals
affect optimal intervention mechanisms and the network performance.
8Of course, if the target action profile depends on (U1, . . . , UN ), the manager needs to know (U1, . . . , UN ) to determine it.
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APPENDIX
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4
Proof: To prove that fa∗,c∗ supports a∗ is equivalent to show
a∗i ∈ arg max
ai∈Ai
ui(fa∗,c∗(ai, a
∗
−i), ai, a
∗
−i) (12)
for all i ∈ N . Note that fa∗,c∗(ai, a∗−i) = [c∗i (ai − a∗i ) + a0]
a0
a
0
. We consider three cases depending on
the sign of c∗i .
Case 1: c∗i = 0.
By (6), we have ∂ui(a0, a∗)/∂ai = 0. Also, we have fa∗,c∗(ai, a∗−i) = a0 for all ai ∈ Ai. Thus, the
objective function in (12) reduces to ui(a0, ai, a∗−i). The condition (7) implies that ui(a0, ai, a∗−i) is a
concave function with respect to ai on Ai. Also, the first-order optimality condition is satisfied at ai = a∗i
since ∂ui(a0, a∗)/∂ai = 0. Therefore, a∗i maximizes ui(a0, ai, a∗−i) on Ai.
Case 2: c∗i > 0.
Since ∂ui(a0, a∗)/∂a0 < 0, we have ∂ui(a0, a∗)/∂ai > 0 by (6). First, consider ai ∈ [ai, a∗i ]. In this
region, fa∗,c∗(ai, a∗−i) = a0, and thus the objective function can be written as ui(a0, ai, a∗−i). Since the
condition (8) implies that ui(a0, ai, a∗−i) is concave with respect to ai on [ai, a∗i ], ui(a0, ai, a∗−i) is strictly
increasing in ai on [ai, a∗i ].
Second, consider ai ∈ [a∗i ,min{ai, a∗i +(a0−a0)/c∗i }]. In this region, fa∗,c∗(ai, a∗−i) = c∗i (ai−a∗i )+a0,
and thus the objective function can be written as ui(c∗i (ai − a∗i ) + a0, ai, a∗−i). The first derivative of
ui(c
∗
i (ai − a
∗
i ) + a0, ai, a
∗
−i) with respect to ai is given by(
c∗i
∂ui
∂a0
+
∂ui
∂ai
) ∣∣∣∣
(a0,ai,a−i)=(c∗i (ai−a
∗
i )+a0,ai,a
∗
−i)
,
while the second derivative is given by the left-hand side of (9). The first derivative is zero at ai = a∗i
by (6), while the second derivative is non-positive by (9). Hence, the first derivative is non-positive
on (a∗i ,min{ai, a
∗
i + (a0 − a0)/c
∗
i }), and thus ui(c∗i (ai − a∗i ) + a0, ai, a∗−i) is non-increasing in ai on
[a∗i ,min{ai, a
∗
i + (a0 − a0)/c
∗
i }].
Lastly, consider ai ∈ [a∗i +(a0−a0)/c∗i , ai]. In this region, fa∗,c∗(ai, a∗−i) = a0, and thus the objective
function can be written as ui(a0, ai, a∗−i). Since the first derivative of ui(a0, ai, a∗−i) with respect to ai
is non-positive on (a∗i + (a0 − a0)/c∗i , ai) by (10), ui(a0, ai, a∗−i) is non-increasing in ai on [a∗i + (a0 −
a0)/c
∗
i , ai].
Case 3: c∗i < 0.
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In this case, ∂ui(a0, a∗)/∂ai < 0 and
fa∗,c∗(ai, a
∗
−i) =


a0 for ai ∈ [ai, a∗i + (a0 − a0)/c∗i ],
c∗i (ai − a
∗
i ) + a0 for ai ∈ [max{ai, a∗i + (a0 − a0)/c∗i }, a∗i ],
a0 for ai ∈ [a∗i , ai].
Following an analogous argument as in Case 2, we can show that the objective function is non-decreasing
in ai on [ai, a∗i ] and strictly decreasing on [a∗i , ai], implying that ai = a∗i maximizes the objective function
on Ai.
Note that if the inequalities in (7), (9), and (11) are strict, we have ai = a∗i as a unique maximizer for
all i ∈ N .
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